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Compromised By Design? Securing the Defense Electronics Supply Chain John Villasenor November 2013
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Document Date: 2014-05-14 19:34:18


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City

Xian / /

Company

IBM / Gartner Inc. / In 2007 / Broadcom / Texas Instruments / AMD / Nvidia / Samsung / Qualcomm / Intel / /

Continent

Asia / Europe / Americas / /

Country

Japan / United States / China / South Korea / India / /

Currency

USD / /

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Company Expansion / /

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UCLA / Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency / Center for Technology Innovation / National Security Agency / Defense Science Board / U.S. government / India Semiconductor Association / NSA’s Trusted Access Program Office / Department of Defense / Chinese government / /

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Obama / John Villasenor / Paul Wolfowitz / /

Position

President / skilled designer / professor of electrical engineering and public policy / Deputy Secretary of Defense / rogue designer / designer / Executive / /

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Vermont / Ohio / /

Region

Eastern Europe / /

Technology

semiconductor / Chip Design / JPEG / actual / physical chip / GPS / large chip / intentionally corrupted chips / corrupted chips / mobile phones / targeted chip / integrated circuits / access large chip / encryption / intentionally compromised chips / designing chips / using verification protocols / smartphones / compromised chip / 2012.28 Chip / integrated circuit / /

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