First Page | Document Content | |
---|---|---|
Date: 2014-10-13 09:49:05Costs Monopoly Game theory Collusion Jean Tirole Natural monopoly Marginal cost Principal–agent problem Oligopoly Economics Market failure Industrial organization | 1 3 OCTOBE R[removed]Scientific Background on the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2014 J E A N T I RO L E : M A R K E T P OW E R A N D R E G U L AT I O N compiled by the Economic ScieAdd to Reading ListSource URL: www.nobelprize.orgDownload Document from Source WebsiteFile Size: 616,31 KBShare Document on Facebook |
A Bit-fixing PRF with O(1) Collusion-Resistance from LWE Alex Davidson1,? and Ryo Nishimaki2 1 2DocID: 1xVY7 - View Document | |
Betrayal, Distrust, and Rationality: Smart Counter-Collusion Contracts for Verifiable Cloud ComputingDocID: 1xUp5 - View Document | |
The Phantom Tollbooth: Privacy-Preserving Electronic Toll Collection in the Presence of Driver Collusion Sarah Meiklejohn∗ UC San Diego Keaton Mowery†DocID: 1xTYF - View Document | |
PDF DocumentDocID: 1wqIu - View Document | |
Theory and Evidence on Employer Collusion in the Franchise Sector Alan B. Krueger and Orley Ashenfelter1 Princeton University and NBER July 18, 2017 First DraftDocID: 1v0mD - View Document |