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Costs / Monopoly / Game theory / Collusion / Jean Tirole / Natural monopoly / Marginal cost / Principal–agent problem / Oligopoly / Economics / Market failure / Industrial organization
Date: 2014-10-13 09:49:05
Costs
Monopoly
Game theory
Collusion
Jean Tirole
Natural monopoly
Marginal cost
Principal–agent problem
Oligopoly
Economics
Market failure
Industrial organization

1 3 OCTOBE R[removed]Scientific Background on the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2014 J E A N T I RO L E : M A R K E T P OW E R A N D R E G U L AT I O N compiled by the Economic Scie

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