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Economics / Market liquidity / Market maker / Efficient-market hypothesis / Stock market / Corporate governance / Financial risk / Corporate finance / Liquidity risk / Financial markets / Financial economics / Finance


THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE • VOL. LXIV, NO. 6 • DECEMBERBlockholder Trading, Market Efficiency, and Managerial Myopia ALEX EDMANS∗ ABSTRACT
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Document Date: 2013-10-09 09:47:25

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Duke / /

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Armour / /

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United States / /

Facility

Boston College / University of Pennsylvania / /

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UCLA / Wharton School / University of Pennsylvania / MIT / Yale / Boston College / MIT Graduate Student Council / NYU / /

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Dirk Jenter / Stewart Myers / Xavier Gabaix / Anna Obizhaeva / Masako Ueda / ALEX EDMANS / Alan Schwartz / Michael Roberts / Chris Evans / Jack Bao / Brockman / Carola Frydman / Gustavo Manso / Paul Yan / Robert Marquez / Steve Ross / Robert Ready / Florian Ederer / Jeremy Stein / Luke Taylor / Adam Kolasinski / Franklin Allen / Cam Harvey / Warren Buffett / Cliff Holderness / /

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THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE / /

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Kyle / /

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