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Corporate finance / Critical thinking / Ulrike Malmendier / Financial economics / Chief financial officer / Mergers and acquisitions / Bias / Cognitive bias / Capital structure / Behavioral economics
Date: 2016-04-22 13:50:28
Corporate finance
Critical thinking
Ulrike Malmendier
Financial economics
Chief financial officer
Mergers and acquisitions
Bias
Cognitive bias
Capital structure
Behavioral economics

Managerial Duties and Managerial Biases* Ulrike Malmendier, Vincenzo Pezone, and Hui Zheng UC Berkeley ABSTRACT The analysis of managerial overconfidence often focuses on one decision-maker, typically the

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