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Date: 2014-02-02 05:15:05Social choice theory Political philosophy Politics Public choice theory Game theory Decision theory Psephology Voting system Electronic voting Stochastic programming Mechanism design Independent voter | Optimal Voting Schemes with Costly Information Acquisition∗ Alex Gershkov† Department of Economics, Hebrew University of JerusalemAdd to Reading ListSource URL: pluto.huji.ac.ilDownload Document from Source WebsiteFile Size: 439,62 KBShare Document on Facebook |
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