CONNECTING PAIRWISE AND POSITIONAL ELECTION OUTCOMES DONALD G. SAARI AND TOMAS J. MCINTEE INSTITUTE FOR MATHEMATICAL BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE, CAAbstract. General conclusions relat

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Date: 2014-11-04 13:01:36 Social choice theory Political philosophy Condorcet criterion Borda count Condorcet loser criterion Voting system Approval voting Marquis de Condorcet Instant-runoff voting Single winner electoral systems Voting system criteria Voting		CONNECTING PAIRWISE AND POSITIONAL ELECTION OUTCOMES DONALD G. SAARI AND TOMAS J. MCINTEE INSTITUTE FOR MATHEMATICAL BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE, CAAbstract. General conclusions relat Add to Reading List Source URL: www.imbs.uci.edu Download Document from Source Website File Size: 224,10 KB Share Document on Facebook

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