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IMPROVING EFFICIENCY IN MATCHING MARKETS WITH REGIONAL CAPS: THE CASE OF THE JAPAN RESIDENCY MATCHING PROGRAM YUICHIRO KAMADA AND FUHITO KOJIMA Department of Economics, Harvard University
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Document Date: 2012-09-26 07:59:49

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City

Fukuoka / Osaka / Boston / Tokyo / Kyoto / Kanagawa / Cambridge / Aichi / New York City / /

Company

Wilson / /

Country

Thailand / Japan / United States / Australia / United Kingdom / India / /

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Facility

Given hospital / Harvard University / /

IndustryTerm

acceptance algorithm / deferred acceptance algorithm / /

Organization

Harvard University / Department of Economics / Chinese Game Theory and Experimental Economics Association / Association of Medical Students / Stanford University Stanford / JAPAN RESIDENCY MATCHING PROGRAM YUICHIRO KAMADA AND FUHITO KOJIMA Department of Economics / Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education / Japanese Economic Association / Japanese government / Experimental Economics Association / Ministry of Health / /

Person

Let / Masataka Kawana / Parag Pathak / Taisuke Matsubae / Aki Matsui / Jun Wako / Keisuke Izumi / Toshiaki Iizuka / Al Roth / Yosuke Yasuda / Sylvain Chassang / Pete Troyan / Dan Sasaki / Yusuke Narita / Kentaro Tomoeda / Ryo Jinnai / Satoru Takahashi / Andy McLennan / William Thomson / /

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Position

government official / general research agenda / model / /

ProvinceOrState

Tottori Prefecture / California / Massachusetts / /

Technology

acceptance algorithm / deferred acceptance algorithm / /

URL

http /

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