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National Resident Matching Program / Cooperative games / Game theory / Matching / Stable marriage problem / Residency / Medical school / Lloyd Shapley / Algorithm / Medical education in the United States / Mathematics / Fellows of the Econometric Society


Document Date: 2006-01-30 13:57:09

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City

Pasadena / /

Company

Bell Labs / /

Country

United States / /

Currency

USD / /

Facility

College Admissions / Stanford University / Georgia Institute of Technology / University of California / /

IndustryTerm

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Organization

UCLA / Association of American Medical Colleges / federal government / Harvard University / Georgia Institute of Technology / Stanford University / US Federal Reserve / University of California / Berkeley / Medicare / /

Person

Dana Randall / Mark Lemley / Lloyd Shapley / David Gale / Vincent Crawford / Paul Milgrom / Sara Robinson / Peter Winkler / Alvin Roth / Alexander Kelso / /

Position

economist / professor / freelance writer / /

ProvinceOrState

California / /

PublishedMedium

the American Mathematical Monthly / /

SportsLeague

Stanford University / /

TVShow

Pasadena / /

Technology

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