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 Date: 2015-03-23 17:51:00Business law Contract A personal selling Purchasing First-price sealed-bid auction Truckee Meadows Water Authority 42 Bid bond Auction Business Auctioneering Auction theory |
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Microsoft Word - DOCS-#v2-MASTER_FORM_Notice_to_Bid_332 | CS364A: Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture #5: Revenue-Maximizing Auctions∗ Tim Roughgarden† October 7,DocID: 1rbWw - View Document |
| CS364A: Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture #4: Algorithmic Mechanism Design∗ Tim Roughgarden† October 2,DocID: 1r3wI - View Document |
| CS364A: Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture #8: Combinatorial and Wireless Spectrum Auctions∗ Tim Roughgarden† October 16, 2013DocID: 1qSxh - View Document |
| The RAND Corporation Strategic Nonparticipation Author(s): Philippe Jehiel and Benny Moldovanu Source: The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Spring, 1996), ppPublished by: Blackwell Publishing on behalfDocID: 1qJxb - View Document |
| CS364A: Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture #2: Mechanism Design Basics∗ Tim Roughgarden† September 25,DocID: 1qE6n - View Document |