The Design of an Eﬃcient Private Industry Philippe Jehiel and Benny Moldovanu∗ May 5, 2003 Abstract Government-sponsored auctions for production rights (e.g., license

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Date: 2014-03-26 06:49:17 Auction theory Auctions Game theory Mathematical analysis Vickrey auction Envelope theorem Economy Business economics Auction VickreyClarkeGroves auction		The Design of an Eﬃcient Private Industry Philippe Jehiel and Benny Moldovanu∗ May 5, 2003 Abstract Government-sponsored auctions for production rights (e.g., license Add to Reading List Source URL: www.econ2.uni-bonn.de Download Document from Source Website File Size: 206,59 KB Share Document on Facebook

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