Judgment Aggregation by Quota Rules: Majority Voting Generalized Franz Dietrich Department of Quantitative Economics University of Maastricht and

First Page		Document Content
Date: 2009-07-30 08:19:30 Propositional calculus Social choice theory Paradoxes Philosophy of language Discursive dilemma Function Proposition Mathematical proof Natural deduction Logic Mathematics Mathematical logic		Judgment Aggregation by Quota Rules: Majority Voting Generalized Franz Dietrich Department of Quantitative Economics University of Maastricht and Add to Reading List Source URL: www.franzdietrich.net Download Document from Source Website File Size: 264,46 KB Share Document on Facebook

	Texto! juillet 2007, vol. XII, n°3 PARADOXES DE LA PARATAXE Nunzio La Fauci Romanisches Seminar – UZH DocID: 1vmDJ - View Document
	Thinking through Paradoxes_Workshop IfS Frankfurt 2016_Program_2016-06-21 DocID: 1vlro - View Document
	9 Wittgenstein and the “Skeptical Paradoxes” Saul Kripkereads out of Wittgenstein’s later writings two skeptical paradoxes and a skeptical solution of each of them. A skeptical solution consists in “conce DocID: 1v1Yy - View Document
	SPERI Paper No. 40 Political Economy and the Paradoxes of Macroprudential Regulation. DocID: 1uzZA - View Document
	An Approximate Dual-Self Model and Paradoxes of Choice under Risk Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine and Zacharias Maniadis1 Abstract DocID: 1u9OX - View Document