Auction in Dynamic Environments: Incorporating the Cost Caused by Re-allocation Shigeo Matsubara NTT Communication Science Laboratories NTT Corporation 2-4 Hikaridai, Seika-cho, “Keihanna Science City”

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Date: 2014-08-06 22:27:08 Business Problem solving Auction Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction Combinatorial auction Mechanism design Revelation principle Vickrey auction Auctioneering Auction theory Game theory		Auction in Dynamic Environments: Incorporating the Cost Caused by Re-allocation Shigeo Matsubara NTT Communication Science Laboratories NTT Corporation 2-4 Hikaridai, Seika-cho, “Keihanna Science City” Add to Reading List Source URL: www.ai.soc.i.kyoto-u.ac.jp Download Document from Source Website File Size: 380,24 KB Share Document on Facebook

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