Sophisticated Experience-weighted Attraction Learning and Strategic Teaching in Repeated Games

First Page		Document Content
Date: 2002-03-25 11:33:19 Mathematics Academia Game theory Outcome Teck-Hua Ho Quantal response equilibrium Nash equilibrium Signaling game Normal-form game Human behavior Experimental economics		Sophisticated Experience-weighted Attraction Learning and Strategic Teaching in Repeated Games Add to Reading List Source URL: people.hss.caltech.edu Download Document from Source Website File Size: 789,19 KB Share Document on Facebook

	1 I. GS E QUILIBRIUM D ERIVATION AND S ELECTION In this appendix, we first derive the equilibria of the signaling game. Then we apply equilibrium selection criteria. A. Equilibrium Derivation DocID: 1sXr1 - View Document
	Sophisticated Experience-weighted Attraction Learning and Strategic Teaching in Repeated Games DocID: 1r4Kn - View Document
	Microsoft Word - Pinocchio30_footnote_in_text.doc DocID: 1qQpm - View Document
	Microsoft Word - SyllabusVGSE2015.rtf DocID: 1qnED - View Document
	Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in Extensive-Form Games Page 1 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in ExtensiveForm Games Ù DocID: 1qibV - View Document