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WHY DID SPONSOR BANKS RESCUE THEIR SIVS? A SIGNALING MODEL OF RESCUES Anatoli Segura CEMFI Working Paper No. 1402
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Document Date: 2014-06-05 09:50:01

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Company

Dang / Vishny / Shleifer / Gorton / Bear Stearns / HSBC / Gennaioli / Holmström / 2007 Citigroup / Financial Times / Plantin / Parlour / /

Country

United States / Italia / United Kingdom / /

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Facility

University of Amsterdam / University of Texas / /

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Holiday

Assumption / /

IndustryTerm

pair bank-vehicle / sponsor bank / bad banks / bank lending / bank balance sheet / bank / good banks / banking / regulated commercial bank / bank capitalization / shadow banking system / bank needs / bank-vehicle pairs / good bank / /

Organization

Vickers Commission / University of Texas at Austin / Fed Board / University of Amsterdam / US Federal Reserve / Copenhagen Business School / European Central Bank / Bank of Spain / AXA Research Fund / European Union / Bank of England / NYU / Independent Commission on Banking / /

Person

David Martinez-Miera / Douglas Gale / Gara Afonso / Javier Suarez / Cecilia Parlatore / Gerard Llobet / Rafael Repullo / Sergio Vicente / Guillermo Caruana / Philipp Schnabl / Guillermo Ordoñez / Anatoli Segura / /

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Position

model of delegated portfolio management / banker / /

Product

DS / /

ProvinceOrState

Texas / /

PublishedMedium

Financial Times / /

Technology

pdf / /

URL

www.cemfi.es / /

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