Montoya

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81foundations_hedonic_2.dvi

foundations_hedonic_2.dvi

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Source URL: montoya.econ.ubc.ca

- Date: 2013-09-24 23:56:20
    82equilibrium_rejection.dvi

    equilibrium_rejection.dvi

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    Source URL: montoya.econ.ubc.ca

    - Date: 2013-09-24 23:56:20
      83RECIPROCAL RELATIONSHIPS AND MECHANISM DESIGN GORKEM CELIK AND MICHAEL PETERS Abstract. We study an incomplete information game in which players can coordinate their actions by contracting among themselves. We model this

      RECIPROCAL RELATIONSHIPS AND MECHANISM DESIGN GORKEM CELIK AND MICHAEL PETERS Abstract. We study an incomplete information game in which players can coordinate their actions by contracting among themselves. We model this

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      Source URL: montoya.econ.ubc.ca

      Language: English - Date: 2013-10-29 09:45:49
        84COMPETING MECHANISMS MICHAEL PETERS, UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Abstract. The recent literature on competing mechanisms has devoted a lot of effort at understanding a very complex and abstract issue. In particular, a

        COMPETING MECHANISMS MICHAEL PETERS, UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Abstract. The recent literature on competing mechanisms has devoted a lot of effort at understanding a very complex and abstract issue. In particular, a

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        Source URL: montoya.econ.ubc.ca

        Language: English - Date: 2014-02-25 00:25:36
          85COMPETING MECHANISMS MICHAEL PETERS DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Abstract. This paper gives a brief explanation of models used in the literature on competing mechanisms. It explains how auctions

          COMPETING MECHANISMS MICHAEL PETERS DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Abstract. This paper gives a brief explanation of models used in the literature on competing mechanisms. It explains how auctions

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          Source URL: montoya.econ.ubc.ca

          Language: English - Date: 2013-09-24 23:56:21
            86CAN MECHANISM DESIGNERS EXPLOIT BUYERS’ MARKET INFORMATION MICHAEL PETERS Abstract. It is known that mechanism designers can extract agents’ information about competitors’ mechanisms in a competing mechanism game.

            CAN MECHANISM DESIGNERS EXPLOIT BUYERS’ MARKET INFORMATION MICHAEL PETERS Abstract. It is known that mechanism designers can extract agents’ information about competitors’ mechanisms in a competing mechanism game.

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            Source URL: montoya.econ.ubc.ca

            Language: English - Date: 2015-05-06 09:55:42
              87ESTIMACIÓN DE LA HUMEDAD DEL SUELO EN CAFETALES A LIBRE EXPOSICIÓN SOLAR Víctor Hugo Ramírez-Builes*; Álvaro Jaramillo-Robledo**; Jaime Arcila-Pulgarín*; Esther Cecilia Montoya-Restrepo*** RESUMEN

              ESTIMACIÓN DE LA HUMEDAD DEL SUELO EN CAFETALES A LIBRE EXPOSICIÓN SOLAR Víctor Hugo Ramírez-Builes*; Álvaro Jaramillo-Robledo**; Jaime Arcila-Pulgarín*; Esther Cecilia Montoya-Restrepo*** RESUMEN

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              Source URL: biblioteca.cenicafe.org

              Language: Spanish - Date: 2015-06-03 13:21:26
                88De…nable and Contractible Contracts Michael Peters and Balázs Szentes June 28, 2011 Abstract This paper analyzes Bayesian normal form games in which players write contracts that

                De…nable and Contractible Contracts Michael Peters and Balázs Szentes June 28, 2011 Abstract This paper analyzes Bayesian normal form games in which players write contracts that

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                Source URL: montoya.econ.ubc.ca

                Language: English - Date: 2013-09-24 23:56:20
                  89Other-Rgarding Preferences

                  Other-Rgarding Preferences

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                  Source URL: montoya.econ.ubc.ca

                  Language: English - Date: 2013-10-22 20:45:48
                    901 1 Reciprocal Contracting Michael Peters

                    1 1 Reciprocal Contracting Michael Peters

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                    Source URL: montoya.econ.ubc.ca

                    Language: English - Date: 2015-03-10 09:55:23