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Information / Agency law / Business law / Law / Organizational theory / Principal–agent problem / Principal / Law of agency / Moral hazard / Asymmetric information / Business / Market failure
Date: 2015-03-14 04:08:59
Information
Agency law
Business law
Law
Organizational theory
Principal–agent problem
Principal
Law of agency
Moral hazard
Asymmetric information
Business
Market failure

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