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Bank regulation in the United States / Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation / Too big to fail / Financial crises / Systemic risk / Market discipline / UBS / Subprime mortgage crisis solutions debate / Financial economics / Economics / Investment
Date: 2009-06-25 10:17:00
Bank regulation in the United States
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Too big to fail
Financial crises
Systemic risk
Market discipline
UBS
Subprime mortgage crisis solutions debate
Financial economics
Economics
Investment

Discussion of “The Failure Mechanics of Dealer Banks” Philipp M. Hildebrand Vice-Chairman of the Governing Board Swiss National Bank June 25, 2009

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