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|---|---|---|
 Date: 2012-06-23 16:23:30Game theory Mathematics Nash equilibrium Subgame perfect equilibrium Subgame Trembling hand perfect equilibrium Extensive-form game Backward induction Potential game Normal-form game Folk theorem |
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