Coalition Formation under Uncertainty: Bargaining Equilibria and the Bayesian Core Stability Concept Georgios Chalkiadakis ∗

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Date: 2008-07-19 11:35:33 Game theory Decision theory Gaming Cooperative game theory Core Coalition Transferable utility Perfect Bayesian equilibrium Extensive-form game Mechanism design Bayesian game		Coalition Formation under Uncertainty: Bargaining Equilibria and the Bayesian Core Stability Concept Georgios Chalkiadakis ∗ Add to Reading List Source URL: www.intelligence.tuc.gr Download Document from Source Website File Size: 166,74 KB Share Document on Facebook

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