Back to Results
First PageMeta Content



NORC at the University of Chicago The University of Chicago Incentives versus Sorting in Tournaments: Evidence from a Field Experiment Author(s): Edwin Leuven, Hessel Oosterbeek, Joep Sonnemans, and Bas van der Klaauw Re
Add to Reading List

Document Date: 2013-03-25 16:40:36


Open Document

File Size: 239,24 KB

Share Result on Facebook

City

Tinbergen Institute Existing / Madrid / Berlin / Amsterdam / Leicester / Paris / /

Country

Netherlands / /

Currency

USD / /

/

Facility

The University of Chicago / University of Amsterdam / University of Chicago The University of Chicago Incentives / VU University / University of Chicago Press / University of Chicago Stable URL / University of Chicago / /

IndustryTerm

tournament theory using sports data / tournament reward systems / tournament systems / information technology / /

Organization

NORC / University of Chicago Press / the University of Chicago / University of Chicago Incentives / University of Amsterdam / Society of Labor Economists / VU University Amsterdam / /

Person

Oosterbeek / Bas van der Klaauw / Erik Plug / Holger Sieg / Edwin Leuven / Van Winden / Sandra Maximiano / Monique de Haan / Van Dijk / /

/

Position

Author / CEO / executive / becoming CEO / corresponding author / /

PublishedMedium

Journal of Labor Economics / /

Technology

information technology / /

URL

http /