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Game theory / Nash equilibrium / Cooperative game / Core / Subgame perfect equilibrium / Trembling hand perfect equilibrium / Solution concept / Subgame / Extensive-form game / Jean-Franois Mertens / Folk theorem / Bayesian game
Date: 2014-03-26 06:49:17
Game theory
Nash equilibrium
Cooperative game
Core
Subgame perfect equilibrium
Trembling hand perfect equilibrium
Solution concept
Subgame
Extensive-form game
Jean-Franois Mertens
Folk theorem
Bayesian game

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