Strategic Learning and Its Limits by H. Peyton Young∗ William H. Sandholm†‡ November 6, 2007 While the cardinal role of game theory in economic analysis is no longer challenged, a fundamental question about the sta

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Date: 2007-12-06 15:27:35 Game theory Mathematics Science and technology Human behavior Drew Fudenberg Correlated equilibrium Peyton Young Nash equilibrium Fictitious play Best response Solution concept Outcome		Strategic Learning and Its Limits by H. Peyton Young∗ William H. Sandholm†‡ November 6, 2007 While the cardinal role of game theory in economic analysis is no longer challenged, a fundamental question about the sta Add to Reading List Source URL: www.ssc.wisc.edu Download Document from Source Website File Size: 67,14 KB Share Document on Facebook

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