Simplicity-Expressiveness Tradeoffs in Mechanism Design † ∗ Felix Fischer

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Date: 2012-10-30 16:18:44 Game theory Mechanism design Auction theory Auctions VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism Vickrey auction Strategyproofness VickreyClarkeGroves auction Sponsored search auction Nash equilibrium		Simplicity-Expressiveness Tradeoffs in Mechanism Design † ∗ Felix Fischer Add to Reading List Source URL: paulduetting.com Download Document from Source Website File Size: 189,62 KB Share Document on Facebook

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