Crowding Games are Sequentially Solvable

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Date: 2012-06-23 16:23:30 Game theory Mathematics Nash equilibrium Subgame perfect equilibrium Subgame Trembling hand perfect equilibrium Extensive-form game Backward induction Potential game Normal-form game Folk theorem		Crowding Games are Sequentially Solvable Add to Reading List Source URL: faculty.biu.ac.il Download Document from Source Website File Size: 138,93 KB Share Document on Facebook

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