Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in Extensive-Form Games Page 1 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in ExtensiveForm Games Ù

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Date: 2010-04-18 23:59:28 Game theory Mathematics Human behavior Subgame Bayesian game Solution concept Perfect Bayesian equilibrium Trembling hand perfect equilibrium Extensive-form game Nash equilibrium Signaling game Information set		Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in Extensive-Form Games Page 1 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in ExtensiveForm Games Ù Add to Reading List Source URL: www.virtualperfection.com Download Document from Source Website File Size: 310,87 KB Share Document on Facebook

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