Solving Stackelberg Games with Uncertain Observability Dmytro Korzhyk, Vincent Conitzer, Ronald Parr Department of Computer Science, Duke University Durham, NC[removed]USA {dima,conitzer,parr - Nash - Document - PDFSEARCH.IO

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Date: 2011-02-06 17:31:24 Stackelberg competition Nash equilibrium Extensive-form game Trembling hand perfect equilibrium Solution concept Best response Strategy Correlated equilibrium Subgame Game theory Problem solving Economics		Solving Stackelberg Games with Uncertain Observability Dmytro Korzhyk, Vincent Conitzer, Ronald Parr Department of Computer Science, Duke University Durham, NC[removed]USA {dima,conitzer,parr}@cs.duke.edu Add to Reading List Source URL: www.cs.duke.edu Download Document from Source Website File Size: 440,55 KB Share Document on Facebook

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