<--- Back to Details
First PageDocument Content
Knowledge / Theory of justification / Reliabilism / Internalism and externalism / Evidentialism / Naturalized epistemology / Probabilistic logic / Gettier problem / Naturalism / Philosophy / Epistemology / Justification
Date: 2010-09-19 10:32:32
Knowledge
Theory of justification
Reliabilism
Internalism and externalism
Evidentialism
Naturalized epistemology
Probabilistic logic
Gettier problem
Naturalism
Philosophy
Epistemology
Justification

Synthese DOI[removed]s11229[removed]of Author Proof

Add to Reading List

Source URL: gregorywheeler.org

Download Document from Source Website

File Size: 212,09 KB

Share Document on Facebook

Similar Documents

Transglobal Evidentialism-Reliabilism and Particularist Epistemic Normativitydraft, no to be quoted) Matjaž Potrč University of Ljubljana

DocID: 1vlG2 - View Document

TE Baker, Lynne, 29–33 belief basic belief, 144, 151–152, 154 evidentialism, 143, 145

DocID: 1sOTc - View Document

Philosophy / Epistemology / Justification / Philosophical movements / Internalism and externalism / Belief / Metatheory / The Will to Believe / Pragmatism / William James / Truth / Evidentialism

„On trust and open windows: A Jamesian Account of Philosophy of Religion“ [Draft version, not for citation!] (Ana Honnacker, M.A.) James can be considered being the focal point1 of the increasing tendency to

DocID: 1renx - View Document

Philosophy / Religion / Philosophy of religion / Christian philosophy / Free will / Christian apologetics / Arguments for the existence of God / Ontological argument / Alvin Plantinga / Problem of evil / Teleological argument / Reformed epistemology

TE Baker, Lynne, 29–33 belief basic belief, 144, 151–152, 154 evidentialism, 143, 145

DocID: 1qVKz - View Document

Philosophy / Epistemology / Philosophy of science / Philosophical movements / Metatheory / Internalism and externalism / Justification / Pragmatism / Neopragmatism / American philosophy / Evidentialism / Relativism

NSP3 Action, Belief and Inquiry

DocID: 1qgrC - View Document