American Economic Review 101 (October 2011): 2590–2615 http: www.aeaweb.org articles.php?doi=aerBayesian Persuasion† By Emir Kamenica and Matthew Gentzkow* When is it possible for one person to p - Non-cooperative game theory - Document - PDFSEARCH.IO

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Date: 2011-10-14 19:39:20 Game theory Paul Milgrom Asymmetric information Non-cooperative games Signaling game		American Economic Review 101 (October 2011): 2590–2615 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=aerBayesian Persuasion† By Emir Kamenica and Matthew Gentzkow* When is it possible for one person to p Add to Reading List Source URL: faculty.chicagobooth.edu Download Document from Source Website File Size: 790,95 KB Share Document on Facebook

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