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| Document Date: 2013-02-20 09:01:53 Open Document File Size: 205,77 KBShare Result on Facebook
Company A. / / / Facility University of Vienna / / IndustryTerm sponsored search market / stable solution / utilities ui / sponsored search results / generalized linear utilities / bidder optimal solution / valuation 1These utilities / 2Reserve utilities / advertising slots / bidder optimal utilities / / Organization Ecole Polytechnique F´ed´erale de Lausanne / University of Vienna / / Person MONIKA HENZINGER / PAUL DUTTING / / URL http /
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