Heterogeneous bids in auctions with rational and boundedly rational bidders - Ohio University - Document - PDFSEARCH.IO

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Date: 2015-03-23 09:37:30 First-price sealed-bid auction Bid shading Auction Double auction Bid Vickrey auction Auctioneering Auction theory Business		Heterogeneous bids in auctions with rational and boundedly rational bidders„Theory and Experiment Add to Reading List Source URL: io.econ.kit.edu Download Document from Source Website File Size: 299,80 KB Share Document on Facebook

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