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Game theory / Auction / First-price sealed-bid auction / Reverse auction / Economy of Iraq / Bid / Oil reserves in Iraq / Rumaila oil field / Common value auction / Auctioneering / Auction theory / Business
Date: 2013-05-14 07:19:18
Game theory
Auction
First-price sealed-bid auction
Reverse auction
Economy of Iraq
Bid
Oil reserves in Iraq
Rumaila oil field
Common value auction
Auctioneering
Auction theory
Business

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