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Market failure / Institutional economists / Economic theories / Law and economics / Oliver E. Williamson / Theory of the firm / Transaction cost / Asset specificity / Hold-up problem / Economics / Business / Industrial organization
Date: 2013-10-18 06:46:35
Market failure
Institutional economists
Economic theories
Law and economics
Oliver E. Williamson
Theory of the firm
Transaction cost
Asset specificity
Hold-up problem
Economics
Business
Industrial organization

Microsoft Word - sciback_ek_en_091002_FINAL

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