First Page | Document Content | |
---|---|---|
Date: 2013-10-18 06:46:35Market failure Institutional economists Economic theories Law and economics Oliver E. Williamson Theory of the firm Transaction cost Asset specificity Hold-up problem Economics Business Industrial organization | Microsoft Word - sciback_ek_en_091002_FINALAdd to Reading ListSource URL: www.nobelprize.orgDownload Document from Source WebsiteFile Size: 331,73 KBShare Document on Facebook |
CREE Working PaperVoluntary contributions to bargaining: hold-up problem in the labDocID: 1sjwx - View Document | |
Ownership, Control, and Incentive Tianxi Wang Abstract The paper shows that the principal can enhance her control over the agent’s human capital by acquiring the physical capital that is critical for him to create valuDocID: 1pQBq - View Document | |
Microsoft Word - RevMauaTables140214RMDocID: 1pQzS - View Document | |
WORKING PAPER N° On the value of partial commitment for cooperative investment in buyer-supplier relationshipDocID: 1pCMt - View Document | |
Microsoft Word - SFB_Newsletter_April_2013DocID: 1p4np - View Document |