Optimal Sovereign Default By K LAUS A DAM AND M ICHAEL G RILL When is it optimal for a fully committed government to default on its legal repayment obligations? Considering a small open economy with domestic production r

First Page		Document Content
Date: 2016-06-07 06:26:09 Economy Money Finance Financial crises Debt Monetary economics Fiscal policy Government debt Natural borrowing limit Sovereign default Bond Deflation		Optimal Sovereign Default By K LAUS A DAM AND M ICHAEL G RILL When is it optimal for a fully committed government to default on its legal repayment obligations? Considering a small open economy with domestic production r Add to Reading List Source URL: adam.vwl.uni-mannheim.de Download Document from Source Website File Size: 237,12 KB Share Document on Facebook

	The Employment Cost of Sovereign Default? Neele L. Balke† May 12, 2017 First version: October 2016 Click for latest version DocID: 1v1t6 - View Document
	Discussion of “Sovereign Default and Monetary Policy Tradeoﬀs”∗ Ricardo Reis London School of Economics 1. DocID: 1uAZT - View Document
	Sovereign Default, Domestic Banks and Financial Institutions Nicola Gennaioli, Alberto Martin and Stefano Rossi∗ This version: NovemberAbstract DocID: 1srWi - View Document
	Fiscal Policy, Sovereign Default, and Bailouts1 Falko Juessen Bergische Universitaet Wuppertal Andreas Schabert2 University of Cologne DocID: 1sdrE - View Document
	FrankfurtVortrag Kämmerer PPP DocID: 1rmwm - View Document