Computing the Optimal Strategy to Commit to ∗ Vincent Conitzer

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Date: 2006-08-10 17:02:13 Gaming Bayesian game Nash equilibrium Best response Strategy Trembling hand perfect equilibrium Zero–sum game Extensive-form game Repeated game Game theory Problem solving Decision theory		Computing the Optimal Strategy to Commit to ∗ Vincent Conitzer Add to Reading List Source URL: www.cs.duke.edu Download Document from Source Website File Size: 181,52 KB Share Document on Facebook

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