Dynamic Revenue Maximization with Heterogeneous Objects: A Mechanism Design Approach Alex Gershkov and Benny Moldovanu∗ Abstract We study the revenue maximizing allocation of several heterogeneous, commonly

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Date: 2014-03-26 06:49:17 Mathematical optimization Operations research Dynamic programming Pricing Marketing Mechanism design Yield management Economic model Economics Macroeconomic model Monopoly Optimal stopping		Dynamic Revenue Maximization with Heterogeneous Objects: A Mechanism Design Approach Alex Gershkov and Benny Moldovanu∗ Abstract We study the revenue maximizing allocation of several heterogeneous, commonly Add to Reading List Source URL: www.econ2.uni-bonn.de Download Document from Source Website File Size: 302,92 KB Share Document on Facebook

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