Near-optimal multi-unit auctions with ordered bidders Elias Koutsoupias London

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Date: 2013-10-31 12:50:34 Auction theory Mechanism design Game theory Marketing Market economics) Auction First-price sealed-bid auction Multiunit auction Prior-independent mechanism		Near-optimal multi-unit auctions with ordered bidders Elias Koutsoupias London Add to Reading List Source URL: www.maths.lse.ac.uk Download Document from Source Website File Size: 330,35 KB Share Document on Facebook

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