<--- Back to Details
First PageDocument Content
Software quality / Stack buffer overflow / Address space layout randomization / Buffer overflow protection / Return-to-libc attack / Buffer overflow / Stack / Shellcode / FALSE / Computing / Software bugs / Software engineering
Date: 2014-05-19 16:48:47
Software quality
Stack buffer overflow
Address space layout randomization
Buffer overflow protection
Return-to-libc attack
Buffer overflow
Stack
Shellcode
FALSE
Computing
Software bugs
Software engineering

Hacking Blind Andrea Bittau, Adam Belay, Ali Mashtizadeh, David Mazi`eres, Dan Boneh Stanford University Abstract—We show that it is possible to write remote stack buffer overflow exploits without possessing a copy of

Add to Reading List

Source URL: www.scs.stanford.edu

Download Document from Source Website

File Size: 470,85 KB

Share Document on Facebook

Similar Documents

ASLR: How Robust is the Randomness? Jonathan Ganz What is Address Space Layout Randomization? ● Provides System-Level Control-Flow Integrity

ASLR: How Robust is the Randomness? Jonathan Ganz What is Address Space Layout Randomization? ● Provides System-Level Control-Flow Integrity

DocID: 1uHp5 - View Document

Q: Exploit Hardening Made Easy  Edward J. Schwartz, Thanassis Avgerinos and David Brumley Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA {edmcman, thanassis, dbrumley}@cmu.edu

Q: Exploit Hardening Made Easy Edward J. Schwartz, Thanassis Avgerinos and David Brumley Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA {edmcman, thanassis, dbrumley}@cmu.edu

DocID: 1rrtf - View Document

TEAM JOCH vs. Android:  The Ultimate Showdown TEAM JOCH vs. Android - ShmooCon 2011

TEAM JOCH vs. Android: The Ultimate Showdown TEAM JOCH vs. Android - ShmooCon 2011

DocID: 1rpSp - View Document

Anatomy of a Remote Kernel Exploit Dan Rosenberg  Copyright © 2011 Virtual Security Research, LLC.

Anatomy of a Remote Kernel Exploit Dan Rosenberg Copyright © 2011 Virtual Security Research, LLC.

DocID: 1qVjv - View Document

Privilege Separation and Pledge Main maid DNS maid  - Theo de Raadt

Privilege Separation and Pledge Main maid DNS maid - Theo de Raadt

DocID: 1qTW0 - View Document