M PRA Munich Personal RePEc Archive Pricing, Advertising, and Market Structure with Frictions Pedro Gomis-Porqueras and Benoit Julien and Chengsi Wang

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Date: 2013-02-12 14:34:36 Auctioneering Marketing Futures contract Auction Perfect competition Market Double auction Economics Business Auction theory		M PRA Munich Personal RePEc Archive Pricing, Advertising, and Market Structure with Frictions Pedro Gomis-Porqueras and Benoit Julien and Chengsi Wang Add to Reading List Source URL: mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de Download Document from Source Website File Size: 471,55 KB Share Document on Facebook

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