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Delegation / Knowledge / Asymmetric information / Agent / Principal


CREPP Working Papers Delegation, Externalities and Organizational Design A. Gautier and D. Paolini
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Document Date: 2007-12-21 08:30:29


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File Size: 151,55 KB

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City

DEIR / /

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Facility

CREPP HEC-Management School University of Liège CREPP Working Paper / Stable Equilibria / /

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Organization

CREPP HEC-Management School University of Liège CREPP Working Paper / /

Person

Jacques Thisse / Jacques Cr´emer / Bernard Caillaud / Francis Bloch / Tito Pietra / Axel Gautier† Dimitri Paolini / /

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Position

second author / Corresponding author / /

PublishedMedium

Quarterly Journal of Economics / Review of Economic Studies / /

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