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| Document Date: 2007-12-21 08:30:29 Open Document File Size: 151,55 KBShare Result on Facebook
City DEIR / / / Facility CREPP HEC-Management School University of Liège CREPP Working Paper / Stable Equilibria / / / Organization CREPP HEC-Management School University of Liège CREPP Working Paper / / Person Jacques Thisse / Jacques Cr´emer / Bernard Caillaud / Francis Bloch / Tito Pietra / Axel Gautier† Dimitri Paolini / / / Position second author / Corresponding author / / PublishedMedium Quarterly Journal of Economics / Review of Economic Studies / /
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