![Mathematical analysis / Probability / Statistics / Probability distributions / Mechanism design / Game theory / Auction theory / Pareto distribution / Expected value / Valuation / Cumulative distribution function / Bayesian-optimal pricing Mathematical analysis / Probability / Statistics / Probability distributions / Mechanism design / Game theory / Auction theory / Pareto distribution / Expected value / Valuation / Cumulative distribution function / Bayesian-optimal pricing](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/6a8a4c71ea52106f35e12d863db49e61.jpg) Date: 2013-10-07 08:34:37Mathematical analysis Probability Statistics Probability distributions Mechanism design Game theory Auction theory Pareto distribution Expected value Valuation Cumulative distribution function Bayesian-optimal pricing | | A lower bound on seller revenue in single buyer monopoly auctions Omer Tamuz∗ October 7, 2013 Abstract We consider a monopoly seller who optimally auctions a single object to a single potentialAdd to Reading ListSource URL: people.hss.caltech.eduDownload Document from Source Website File Size: 173,17 KBShare Document on Facebook
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