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Welfare economics / Economics / Auction theory / Problem solving / Mechanism design / Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction / Fair division / Valuation / Pareto efficiency / Game theory / Auctioneering / Business


Mechanism Design for Fair Division∗ Richard Cole† Vasilis Gkatzelis‡ Gagan Goel§
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Document Date: 2013-01-31 17:23:02


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File Size: 373,38 KB

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Country

Czech Republic / /

Currency

USD / /

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Facility

Courant Institute / New York University / /

IndustryTerm

implemented solution / shared computing clusters / appropriate solution / proposed solutions / polynomial time algorithm / internet / accepted solution / regarded solutions / computing / fair solution / resource allocation protocols / cloud computing / attractive solution / approximate solutions / /

Organization

New York University / National Science Foundation / Courant Institute / Czech government / Fair Division / /

Person

Frank Kelly / John Nash / Richard Cole / /

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Position

fraction player / mechanism designer / arbitrary player / player / participating player / second author / removing player / /

Technology

resource allocation protocols / polynomial time algorithm / peer-to-peer / /

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