Feferman on Godel and Free Will Abstract Feferman surveys the work of Godel and Turing, and, although not himself holding a mechanist view of the mind as a whole, raises objections to the anti-mechanist argument put fo

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Date: 2010-11-17 13:56:05 Guggenheim Fellows Mathematical logic Cognitive science Materialism Mechanism Naturalism George Boolos Logic Modal logic Mathematical proof Solomon Feferman Contradiction		Feferman on Godel and Free Will Abstract Feferman surveys the work of Godel and Turing, and, although not himself holding a mechanist view of the mind as a whole, raises objections to the anti-mechanist argument put fo Add to Reading List Source URL: users.ox.ac.uk Download Document from Source Website File Size: 71,33 KB Share Document on Facebook

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