E¢ cient Allocations with Moral Hazard and Hidden Borrowing and Lending: A Recursive Formulation Árpád Ábrahám y and Nicola Pavoni z MayAbstract

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Date: 2011-02-21 08:55:53 Computer programming Academia Mathematical optimization Software engineering Equations Asymmetric information Game theory Economic theories Contract theory Dynamic programming Recursion		E¢ cient Allocations with Moral Hazard and Hidden Borrowing and Lending: A Recursive Formulation Árpád Ábrahám y and Nicola Pavoni z MayAbstract Add to Reading List Source URL: apps.eui.eu Download Document from Source Website File Size: 471,04 KB Share Document on Facebook

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