Price mechanism

Results: 172



#Item
1Market Responsive Pricing Policy Mechanism Brief The success of an energy procurement program often hinges upon determining the appropriate fixed price paid for energy. Market Responsive Pricing (MRP) is an effective and

Market Responsive Pricing Policy Mechanism Brief The success of an energy procurement program often hinges upon determining the appropriate fixed price paid for energy. Market Responsive Pricing (MRP) is an effective and

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Source URL: www.clean-coalition.org

Language: English - Date: 2013-07-17 20:42:03
    2Futures Market Dynamic Price Banding Mechanism I. Reasons for development TAIFEX plans to launch its own dynamic price banding mechanism for the futures market, in order to enhance the stability of market prices, bring t

    Futures Market Dynamic Price Banding Mechanism I. Reasons for development TAIFEX plans to launch its own dynamic price banding mechanism for the futures market, in order to enhance the stability of market prices, bring t

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    Source URL: www.taifex.com.tw

    - Date: 2017-11-30 22:09:36
      3Futures Market Dynamic Price Banding Mechanism Invigorating Futures Trading and Serving the Real Economy Fulfilling Hedging Needs and Facilitating Price Discovery  Taiwan Futures Exchange

      Futures Market Dynamic Price Banding Mechanism Invigorating Futures Trading and Serving the Real Economy Fulfilling Hedging Needs and Facilitating Price Discovery Taiwan Futures Exchange

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      Source URL: www.taifex.com.tw

      - Date: 2017-11-30 04:53:14
        4Equilibrium Efficiency and Price Complexity in Sponsored Search Auctions Moshe Babaioff∗ Tim Roughgarden†

        Equilibrium Efficiency and Price Complexity in Sponsored Search Auctions Moshe Babaioff∗ Tim Roughgarden†

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        Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

        Language: English - Date: 2010-05-25 00:22:55
        50 An Expressive Mechanism for Auctions on the Web ¨ PAUL DUTTING , London School of Economics and Political Science MONIKA HENZINGER, University of Vienna

        0 An Expressive Mechanism for Auctions on the Web ¨ PAUL DUTTING , London School of Economics and Political Science MONIKA HENZINGER, University of Vienna

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        Source URL: paulduetting.com

        Language: English - Date: 2015-06-25 03:05:02
        6CS364A: Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture #5: Revenue-Maximizing Auctions∗ Tim Roughgarden† October 7,

        CS364A: Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture #5: Revenue-Maximizing Auctions∗ Tim Roughgarden† October 7,

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        Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

        Language: English - Date: 2015-09-22 16:28:39
        7CS364A: Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture #4: Algorithmic Mechanism Design∗ Tim Roughgarden† October 2,

        CS364A: Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture #4: Algorithmic Mechanism Design∗ Tim Roughgarden† October 2,

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        Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

        Language: English - Date: 2015-09-22 16:26:58
        8CS364A: Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture #2: Mechanism Design Basics∗ Tim Roughgarden† September 25,

        CS364A: Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture #2: Mechanism Design Basics∗ Tim Roughgarden† September 25,

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        Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

        Language: English - Date: 2015-12-03 15:09:27
        9C:/Pat_at_portable/latex/EnglishPub/MarkovMbid/latex8.dvi

        C:/Pat_at_portable/latex/EnglishPub/MarkovMbid/latex8.dvi

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        Source URL: netecon.seas.harvard.edu

        Language: English - Date: 2009-12-16 17:13:06
        10CS264: Beyond Worst-Case Analysis Lecture #18: Pricing with an Unknown Distribution∗ Tim Roughgarden† November 19,

        CS264: Beyond Worst-Case Analysis Lecture #18: Pricing with an Unknown Distribution∗ Tim Roughgarden† November 19,

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        Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

        Language: English - Date: 2015-01-17 16:48:13