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Business models / Auction / Bid price / Purchasing / Emissions trading / Auction sniping / Business / Auctioneering / Auction theory
Date: 2014-12-19 16:33:57
Business models
Auction
Bid price
Purchasing
Emissions trading
Auction sniping
Business
Auctioneering
Auction theory

Attachment B: Examples Auction Notice California Cap-and-Trade Program and Québec Cap-and-Trade System Joint Auction of Greenhouse Gas Allowances

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