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Economics / Backward induction / Subgame perfect equilibrium / Ultimatum game / Solution concept / Subgame / Bargaining / Experimental economics / Trembling hand perfect equilibrium / Game theory / Problem solving / Decision theory


Detecting Failures of Backward Induction: Monitoring Information Search in Sequential Bargaining* Eric J. Johnson Columbia School of Business Columbia University
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Document Date: 2012-12-26 07:54:20


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Rochester / Toronto / Herzliya / Florence / /

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Spiegel / Wilson / Cox / Teck / /

Country

Israel / /

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USD / /

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Facility

Business Columbia University / The Interdisciplinary Center / Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena / Temple University Philadelphia / Columbia University / New York University / /

IndustryTerm

heuristic processing / software system / verbal protocols / information search / social utilities / job-search experiment / /

Organization

Columbia University / School of Business / New York University / National Science Foundation / MIT / Cornell / Harvard / Sankar Sen Fox School of Business and Management / Colin Camerer Division of the Humanities / Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena / Interdisciplinary Center / Temple University Philadelphia / Sequential Bargaining* Eric J. Johnson Columbia School of Business Columbia University New York NY / Talia Rymon Arison School of Business / /

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Newell / David Goldstein / Rabin / Simon / See Payne / Rachel Croson / Brian Becker / Keith Weigelt / Eric J. Johnson / Schkade / Ben Wilner / Barry Blecherman / Bettman / Gerard Cachon / Hua Ho / /

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Position

first player / responding player / much bargaining power player / game player / second player / outside observer / Carpenter / player / leading player / /

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Minnesota / Pennsylvania / California / /

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