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 Date: 2010-05-25 00:22:55Auction theory Game theory Auctions Mechanism design Mathematics Decision theory VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism VickreyClarkeGroves auction Sponsored search auction Valuation Auction Vickrey auction |
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Equilibrium Efficiency and Price Complexity in Sponsored Search Auctions Moshe Babaioff∗ Tim Roughgarden†
![BNE and Auction Theory Homework 1. For two agents with values U [0, 1] and U [0, 2], respectively: (a) show that the first-price auction is not socially optimal in BNE. (b) give an auction with “pay your bid if you win](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/26edde5edc3f5ad99d2c4f69417dfd70.jpg "BNE and Auction Theory Homework 1. For two agents with values U [0, 1] and U [0, 2], respectively: (a) show that the first-price auction is not socially optimal in BNE. (b) give an auction with “pay your bid if you win")
