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Market failure / Organizational theory / Principal–agent problem / Markov processes / Incentive / Mechanism design / Reinforcement learning / Markov decision process / Group action / Statistics / Dynamic programming / Asymmetric information
Date: 2013-09-13 16:46:35
Market failure
Organizational theory
Principal–agent problem
Markov processes
Incentive
Mechanism design
Reinforcement learning
Markov decision process
Group action
Statistics
Dynamic programming
Asymmetric information

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