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Public choice theory / Bias / Media bias / Socialism / Politics / Property / Rent-seeking / Political science / Political economy / Economics / Renting
Date: 2014-01-24 02:05:31
Public choice theory
Bias
Media bias
Socialism
Politics
Property
Rent-seeking
Political science
Political economy
Economics
Renting

The Political Economy of the Media Bias: Russian Case Abstract The paper is devoted to the media market problems and the possibility of the media bias generated and sustained by journalists’ and media-owners’ person

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