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Contract law / Business / Information / Government procurement in the United States / United States administrative law / Principal–agent problem / Agency cost / Outsourcing / Privatization / Public economics / Asymmetric information / Economics


The Innovation Journal: The Public Sector Innovation Journal Volume 14(2), 2009, article 3. INFORMATION ASYMMETRY AND THE CONTRACTING OUT PROCESS FRANCIS AMAGOH
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Document Date: 2009-10-18 12:53:48

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City

Fieldheim / Feildheim / Feldheim / /

Company

Principal-Agent Theory / Rai / Privatization Introduction / Contracting Out / Public Sector Organizations / Privatization Introduction Public / Russell / /

Country

United States / /

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IndustryTerm

capable contractors / certain peripheral services / health services / asset-specific services / security services / janitorial services / public services / social services / /

Organization

PROCESS FRANCIS AMAGOH Department of Public Administration / Public Administration / federal government / Internal Revenue Service / U.S. government / Council of State Governments / /

Person

Van Slyke / FRANCIS AMAGOH / /

Position

retail sales cashier / contractor / single contractor / incompetent contractor / high-technology entrepreneur / producer / Dean / measuring contractor / /

PublishedMedium

The Innovation Journal / /

SocialTag